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Politics
Substantial changes have taken place 
in the last few years in Saudi Arabia, 
especially within the local political-
intellectual field. Significant among 
these is the rise to prominence of a 
group of “Islamo-liberals,” who are 
“made up of former Islamists and lib-
erals, Sunnis and Shiites, calling for a 
democratic change within an Islamic 
framework through a revision of the 
official Wahhabi religious doctrine.”1 Although not all have given as 
much importance to religious criticism as they have to political criti-
cism, the critique of Wahhabism—in its political, social, and religious 
aspects2—has undoubtedly been one of the mainsprings of this new 
trend. That is not to say that this phenomenon is completely without 
precedence in Saudi Arabia: certain doctrinal aspects of Wahhabism 
had, at times, come under attack by prominent ulama from al-Hijaz 
and al-Hasa provinces and—though less commonly—from “dissident” 
ulama from the Najd region, the birthplace of Wahhabism. However, 
the word “Wahhabism” itself was not long ago nearly completely taboo. 
The few critiques that surfaced came mostly from Saudis belonging to 
peripheral geographical or religio-po-
litical groups, and these moves were 
always isolated. What we have today 
is quite different: the critique of Wah-
habism—which is now often bluntly 
called by this name—has gained 
ground. It touches upon all aspects of 
the Wahhabi tradition, and even comes 
from within Wahhabism’s own ideolog-
ical and geographical core.
Critical trends
Among the non-Shiite3 critical 
trends, the first includes Saudi liber-
als, such as writer and political analyst 
Turki al-Hamad, who for decades had 
denounced social manifestations of Wahhabism, such as the religious 
police or the ban on women’s driving. This group has, in the post-9/11 
climate, considerably sharpened its criticism and clearly indicated their 
enemy by name. Secondly, a group of young and daring intellectuals—
Mansur al-Nuqaidan and Mishari al-Zayidi being the two best known—
have taken advantage of the Islamic credentials inherited from their 
Islamist past in order to develop an Islamic critique of Wahhabism. 
Through a series of articles they have denounced “the excesses of the 
Wahhabi doctrine,” notably drawing an explicit link between it and the 
jihadi violence experienced by the country since May 2003. Thirdly, 
some Islamic thinkers have, since the mid-1990s, formulated a salafi 
critique of Wahhabism. Hasan al-Maliki, the most prominent among 
these, castigates the doctrinal rigidity of Wahhabism and its tendency 
to slavishly imitate Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyya, rather than to 
create thoughts on the basis of what are, in his view, genuine Salafism 
tenets. Abdallah al-Hamid shares al-Maliki’s belief that Wahhabism has 
only become a caricature of true Salafism and calls for a return to the 
latter. This is a condition which becomes for him the theoretical basis 
of his pro-democracy activism. Lastly, a fourth kind of critique has ap-
peared which could be called a Wahhabi critique of Wahhabism. One 
of its champions is Islamist lawyer and political activist Abd al-Aziz al-
Qasim, who insists on the internal plurality of the original Wahhabi tra-
dition as it has developed over the past 250 years, and believes that he 
can revive some of its most tolerant aspects. 
Governmental backing
What is even more unprecedented is 
that the Saudi government has partly 
subscribed to these critical trends and 
has taken a number of preliminary steps 
towards—though not yet political—but 
at least social and religious reform. The 
organization in June 2003 of the first 
national dialogue conference in which 
thirty ulama belonging to all the con-
fessional groups present in the kingdom’s territory—Wahhabi and non-
Wahhabi Sunnis, Sufis, Ismaili, and Twelver Shiites—participated was a 
clear move in that direction. This conference led to the adoption of a 
charter containing a set of “recommendations.” Some of these can be 
considered as a severe blow to the Wahhabi doctrine: first, the charter 
acknowledges the intellectual and confessional diversity of the Saudi na-
tion, which is contrary to traditional Wahhabi exclusivism; second, it criti-
cizes one of Wahhabism’s juridical pillars, the principle of sadd al-dhara’i' 
(the blocking of the means), which requires that actions that could lead 
to committing sins must themselves be prohibited. It is notably in pursu-
ing this principle that women are denied the right to drive in Saudi Ara-
bia. Furthermore, none of the figures of 
the official Wahhabi establishment were 
invited to attend the conference, which 
obviously denotes a willingness to mar-
ginalize them. In addition, the fact that 
the government-controlled press has 
recently opened its columns to the Is-
lamo-liberals’ religious criticism clearly 
reflects a degree of official support for 
it. It is also worth noting that there have 
been some improvements on two cru-
cial socio-religious issues: the status of 
women, whose economic role has of-
ficially been acknowledged and who 
have been given a voice in the national 
dialogue, and that of the Shiites, who 
have recently witnessed a relative loosening of the restrictions imposed 
on their religious practice.
It therefore seems that part of the ruling elite now acknowledges the 
necessity for a revision of Wahhabism. The reasons for this go far be-
yond the American pressures on the kingdom. It 
has indeed become clear that only such a move 
would permit the creation of a true Saudi nation, 
based on the modern and inclusive value of citi-
zenship—a reality still missing and much needed 
in times of crisis. However, the sticking point is 
that this ideological shift must go hand in hand 
with a radical reformulation of old political alli-
ances both at home and abroad. And therein lies 
the problem.
S T É P H A N E  L A C R O I XThe critique of Wahhabism has gained 
unprecedented momentum in Saudi Arabia in 
recent years. First formulated by a small group 
of prominent liberal and Islamist intellectuals, 
it seems to have received the approval of at 
least part of the ruling elite who have taken 
a few official steps towards socio-religious 
reform. But is Saudi Arabia ready to enter 
the era of Post-Wahhabism?
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1. Stéphane Lacroix, “Between Islamists and 
Liberals: Saudi Arabia’s New Islamo-liberal 
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(Summer 2004): 345-65. 
2. “Wahhabism” initially refers to the religious 
tradition developed over the centuries by 
the ulama of the official Saudi religious 
establishment founded by the heirs of 
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It is 
however commonly used in Saudi Arabia 
in a broader meaning, encompassing its 
social and political implications. 
3. Shiite critique on Wahhabism has a long 
history given the antagonism between 
the two. Currently the Saudi Shiite reformist 
intellectuals, as part of their strategy of 
conciliation with the regime, are careful 
not to publicly make direct attacks on 
Wahhabism.
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The critique ... 
even comes from within 
Wahhabism’s own ideological 
and geographical core. 
